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INTRODUCTION 
 
Clara Abbott and Lettie Pate Whitehead were two of the first 
female corporate directors in the United States—Clara Abbott as director 
of Abbott Laboratories in 1900 and Lettie Pate Whitehead as a board 
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member of Coca-Cola in 1934.1 Despite these seemingly early stepping 
stones, both Abbott and Whitehead arguably only received the positions 
because their husbands were founders of their respective companies; the 
board only offered Whitehead the role upon her husband’s death.2 It was 
not until 1972 that Katharine Graham was the first female Fortune 500 
CEO,3 and it was not even until 2001 that Sarah Hogg became the first 
female to chair an FTSE 100 company.4 These statistics highlight 
corporations’ neglect towards appointing women board members and that 
nepotism permeates corporate boards and their decisions. How meaningful 
were Abbott's and Whitehead’s positions, if there was such an immense 
time gap until another promotion of a woman to director or board member? 
 Gender diversity in corporate boardrooms has evolved into one of 
the most prevalent issues that corporate boardrooms face—to the extent 
that people termed it “the issue of 2017.”5 This is because a corporate 
board constitutes the crux of a corporation, and consequently, scholars and 
individuals closely scrutinized the board’s structure and composition, 
especially in recent years.6 Though much progress remains to truly achieve 
gender parity in the boardroom, corporations over the last decade 
increasingly began to dedicate the effort and resources to improving 
gender diversity on their boards. Once strictly a world of homogeneity and 
nepotism, today women have begun to take their seats at the table and are 
continuing to do so while demanding respect and making an impact on the 
company’s decisions. 
 This paper will first trace the history and evolution of gender 
diversity on boards. It then will assess why the growing trend toward 
 
*  J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law 2020 
1 David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Pioneering Women on Boards: 
Pathways of the First Female Directors, STANFORD CLOSER LOOK SERIES 1, 2 
(Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/qg-
diverseboards.pdf. 
2 Id.  
3 Julia Carpenter, Womine in the Fortune 500: 64 CEOs in half a 
century, CNN MONEY (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://money.cnn.com/interactive/pf/femail-ceos-timeline/. 
4 Roland Gribben, Hogg makes history as FTSE 100 chair, THE 
TELEGRAPH (May 19, 2001, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2718677/Hogg-makes-history-as-FTSE-
100-chair.html. 
5 Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in 
Boardrooms, 94 IND. L. J. 145, 155 (2019). 
6 Id. at 153–55. 
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greater gender diversity became prevalent in recent years and the effects 
of this trend. Third, the paper addresses the social impacts that increasing 
gender diversity on boards will place on companies. Lastly, this paper 
concludes by discussing and suggesting policy implications that would 
enhance boardroom gender diversity and would ultimately achieve gender 
equality.  
 Because of the immense significance that boards represent in 
corporate America today, gender diversity in the boardroom is especially 
critical in modern society.7 Although scholars are split over the extent to 
which gender-diverse boards concretely impact a corporation and its 
overall performance, studies consistently offer evidence that gender 
diversity can enhance decision making and improve the corporate image. 
Regardless of the impact’s extent, it is immensely clear that gender 
diversity in corporate boardrooms would not harm, but could only benefit 
corporations; thus, there needs to be no business justification for increased 
female representation in a historically female-underrepresented world.  
 
I. HISTORY OF GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS 
A. Understanding the Breakdown of a Corporate Board 
 To trace the history of corporate boards, it is important to 
understand the structure of a board and how it works. Today, shareholders 
elect the board of directors.8 These board members consist of three 
different categories: chairman, inside directors, and outside directors.9  
First, the chairman of the board, whom the board of directors 
elects, is the leader of the corporation, in the sense that his or her primary 
duty is to run the board “smoothly and effectively[;]” specifically, he or 
she is responsible for communicating with the CEO and other high-level 
executives of the corporation, developing the corporation’s business 
strategy, serving as the representative of management and of the board to 
the general public and to shareholders, and preserving integrity of the 
company.10  
Second, the inside directors, who are typically internal 
shareholders or high-level managers of the company, are tasked with 
approving high-level budgets that the upper management formulated, 
 
7 Id. at 146. 
8 Investopedia Staff, The Basics of Corporate Structure, INVESTOPEDIA 
FIN. DICTIONARY (last updated Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/022803.asp.  
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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enforcing and regulating business strategy, and approving important 
company initiatives and policies; inside directors are also known as 
executive directors if they comprise the management team of the 
corporation.11  
Lastly, the outside directors, unlike the inside directors, bear no 
direct relationship to the management team; however, the outside directors 
do help to determine important strategies and policies of the company, as 
well as to offer objective and unbiased opinions regarding any issue that 
the board faces.12 Overall, corporate board directors review the behavior 
of the corporate officers and executives, adopt general policies in 
accordance with the company’s mission and vision, rather than partake in 
the company’s daily decision-making processes.13  Because the board of 
directors serves such an important oversight role of a corporation—
essentially dictating the company’s major decisions—one can understand 
why the board composition is especially crucial, and thus, why the board 
faces strict scrutiny; specifically in recent years, the increased advocacy 
for equality in the workplace even more so explains such strict scrutiny 
that corporate boards endured. 
 
B. The Evolution of Corporate Boards’ Composition 
 Prior to the twentieth century, a majority of the companies were 
small and family-owned.14 With the burst of technology in the twentieth 
century, corporations began expanding, emphasizing that the goal of the 
board is to support the CEO’s plan and to convince the shareholders that 
experienced and intelligent individuals maintain the shareholders’ 
interests; due to this priority, what corporations deemed the “best board” 
consisted of like-minded and known individuals.15 This homogenous 
environment created several consequences—not only did the directors rely 
on the CEO for their positions, causing a lack of sufficient independence, 
 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  
13 Jean Murray, What Does a Corporate Board of Directors Do?, THE 
BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS (last updated Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-does-a-corporate-board-of-directors-do-
398865.  
14 The Basics of Corporate Structure, supra note 8. 
15 Russell Reynolds Associates, Inc., Different is Better—Why Diversity 
Matters in the Boardroom, RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES 1 (2009), 
https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/Insights/thought-
leadership/Documents/different-is-better_0.pdf. 
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but also the presence of predominantly pre-existing relationships created 
a very narrow-minded atmosphere.16  
As globalization and the evolution of technology boomed 
throughout the century, the need for risk management and more dynamic 
work environments forced companies to broaden their boards.17 The intent 
behind the types of board members who were elected shifted to “the 
deliberate creation of a dynamic and a chemistry that allow[ed] for the 
effective execution of corporate governance and strategic oversight[;]” 
this change emphasized “an environment in which challenging issues can 
be confronted, opposing opinions are sought [sic] and trust is implicit.”18 
Culminating the twentieth century with this shift and continuing this trend 
into the beginning of the twenty-first century, most companies today are 
“large international conglomerates that trade publicly on one or many 
global exchanges”19—completely contrary to companies before the 
twentieth century.20 
 
C.  The United States and Gender Diverse Corporate Boardrooms 
1. America’s Approach to Gender Diversity on Boards 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established immense 
protections for gender equality in the workplace. However, even though 
Title VII prohibited discrimination on the basis of gender in the workplace, 
Title VII barred discrimination against employees only. Unfortunately, 
because Title VII failed to mention any reference to directors or board 
members, directors were and remain beyond the scope of Title VII’s 
protections.21 Congress attempted to protect women specifically in 
corporate America through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act. Although the Act mandated that the SEC 
implement an Office of Minority and Women Inclusion to assess “the 
diversity policies and practices of entities regulated by the agency[,] the 
statute expressly d[id] not give the SEC authority to require diversity 
measures.”22 As a result of this minimal statutory regulation, the United 
States employed and continues to employ a “soft regulatory approach” to 
 
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 The Basics of Corporate Structure, supra note 8.  
20 Id. 
21 Barbara Black, Stalled: Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, 37 
U. OF DAYTON L. REV. 7, 11 (2011).  
22 Id. 
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deal with gender diversity within corporate boardrooms.23 This approach 
mandated companies to disclose only the presence or the absence of a 
diversity policy at the company, as well as to disclose to the company’s 
investors, only a brief description of the diversity policy.24  
Since 2004, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
NASDAQ have been the corporate regulators primarily responsible for 
mandating the corporate governance standards for corporations 
enumerated for trading on their exchanges.25 In 2002, due to Enron’s and 
Worldcom’s failures, the SEC urged the NYSE and NASDAQ to reassess 
their corporate governance standards.26 As a result, the SEC approved the 
NYSE proposal, Section 303A of the NYSE Listed Company’s Manual. 
Section 303A mandated that enumerated corporations have: 1) 
predominantly independent directors, 2) an independent nominating 
committee tasked with determining qualified board candidates following 
criteria approved by the board, and 3) an independent audit committee, 
consisting of financially literate members, one of whom has accounting or 
related financial-management skills.27 The NYSE predicated these 
requirements on a desire to promote “the ability of honest and well-
intentioned directors . . . to perform their functions effectively . . . [and to] 
allow shareholders to . . . monitor the performance of companies and 
directors in order to reduce instances of lax and unethical behavior.”28 The 
NYSE created these standards not only to prevent fraud but also to 
facilitate broader searches to include well-qualified and independent 
directors in hopes of electing more female directors. However, the NYSE 
and the NASDAQ had neither diversity listing standards nor made any 
effort to adopt any such standards.29  
In 2008, only fifty-five of ninety-four companies revealed that 
they focused on diversity, and only five corporations stated that they used 
gender as criteria in choosing candidates for directors.30 For example, the 
corporation Emcor neither had mention of diversity in its disclosure, nor 
did it employ any female board members; pursuant to the SEC 
 
23 Yaron Nili, supra note 5, at 183. 
24 Id.  
25 Black, supra note 21, at 15. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 15–16. 
28 Id. at 16 (quoting NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to 
Corporate Governance, SEC Rel. No. 34-48745, 81 SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 
2003)). 
29 Id. 
30 Yaron Nili, supra note 5, at 184. 
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requirements, Emcor provided that it considered diversity when 
nominating a candidate, but “its focus is on obtaining a diversity of 
professional expertise rather than a diversity of personal characteristics.”31 
Even when Emcor increased its board size to ten directors, it still neglected 
to add any female directors.32  
Before 2009, Congress and the SEC did not require boards in the 
U.S. to disclose information concerning their methods for nominating 
candidates, specifically concerning their diversity principles.33 
Additionally, in the SEC’s initial proposals of disclosure requirements for 
companies, legislation Item 407, the SEC failed to provide a requirement 
for mandatory disclosure about diversity; in fact, Item 407 failed even to 
address diversity at all.34 However, the SEC did seek suggestions 
regarding whether it should amend the proposals to include such diversity 
disclosure requirements for the nominating committees. As a result, in 
2009, the SEC amended Regulation S-K, noting that the SEC received 
many suggestions that indicated the need for corporate boards to provide 
their diversity practices; doing so would be a means to achieve perspective 
into the corporate governance procedures of these companies.35 
Additionally, the SEC was “interested in understanding whether investors 
and other market participants believe that diversity in the boardroom is a 
significant issue.”36 Among the proponents who sent such comments 
included California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and 
the California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS), two of the 
largest and most socially active pension funds.37 These comments included 
remarks that disclosure of boardroom diversity practices was crucial 
information to provide to investors, and doing so would allow investors to 
make more informed voting decisions.38 As a result of these suggestions, 
in December 2009, the SEC issued Item 407(c) that required companies 
to:  
 
[d]escribe . . . whether, and if so how, the nominating 
committee (or the board) considers diversity in 
identifying nominees for director. If the nominating 
committee (or the board) has a policy with regard to the 
 
31 Id. at 186. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 183. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Black, supra note 21, at 14. 
37 David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Gender Diversity on Boards: 
The Future is Almost Here; Corporate Governance, N.Y. L. J. (2016). 
38 Id.  
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consideration of diversity in identifying director 
nominees, describe how this policy is implemented, as 
well as how the nominating committee (or the board) 
assesses the effectiveness of its policy[.]”39 
 
In its Final Release, the SEC “agree[d] that it is useful for 
investors to understand how the board considers and addresses diversity, 
as well as the board’s assessment of the implementation of its diversity 
policy[;]” additionally, the SEC declared that even though “the 
amendments are not intended to steer behavior, diversity policy disclosure 
may also induce beneficial changes in board composition.”40 Such changes 
might include nominating committees performing broader searches—this 
would not only increase director quality but also eliminate pre-existing 
relationships between directors and board members, ultimately 
encouraging increased independence among the board and management 
team from the directors.41 Nonetheless, this regulation still failed to 
formally define “diversity” and gave discretion to companies to interpret 
diversity within their procedures and disclosures.42 The SEC predicated 
this decision upon its belief that because corporations could define 
diversity differently based upon each of their own varied opinions, 
“companies should be allowed to define diversity in ways that they 
consider appropriate.”43  
Even the executive branch struggled with improving gender 
diversity on corporate boards. Specifically, the U.S. Department of 
Treasury failed to capitalize on several chances offered by the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) to enhance gender diversity in 
boardrooms.44 Due to TARP bailing out five corporations in 2009, the U.S. 
Department of Treasury constituted a controlling shareholder, presenting 
itself with the opportunity to either choose or greatly influence the hiring 
of new directors at these various companies.45 However, the Department 
of Treasury failed to improve gender diversity on these boards.46 For 
example, in 2009, the Treasury owned 33.6% common-stock interest in 
 
39 Black, supra note 21, at 13.  
40 Id. at 14.  
41 Id. 
42 Russell Reynolds Associates, supra note 15, at 40. 
43 Black, supra note 21, at 14 (quoting Proxy Disclosure 
Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009)).  
44 Id. at 11.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 11–12. 
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Citigroup; in mid-2009, due to bankruptcy, the Treasury gained control of 
GM and Chrysler; and in 2010, the Treasury gained control of American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG).47 All of this new control and ownership 
that the Treasury inherited meant that the Treasury elected each 
company’s board of directors.48 For Citigroup, the Treasury elected eight 
new independent directors to the board, seven of whom were men with a 
median age of sixty-three; for AIG, six of the seven newly elected directors 
were men with a median age of sixty-four; for GM and Chrysler, the 
Treasury had the power to elect fourteen new directors, eleven of whom 
were male with a median age of sixty.49 Although the Department of 
Treasury never actually revealed what specific qualifications it considered 
crucial in appointing directors, its failure to increase diversity and to shy 
away from the stereotypical template of homogeneity indicated that 
diversity was not a significant attribute.50 The Treasury’s silence revealed 
the great progress still ahead of corporate America concerning gender 
diversity.  
2. Why Minimal Female Representations on Boards  
 The predominant reasons for a stagnant level of female 
representation on corporate boards are that corporations wish to preserve 
“social comfort levels and board cohesion, narrow search criteria and 
procedures for selecting new directors,” skepticism of appointing women 
to the boards, and sex discrimination.51 Additionally, especially since the 
2008 economic recession, businesses increasingly faced pressures to 
enhance their companies, so they have not viewed increasing gender 
diversity in their boardrooms as “a business imperative.”52 Furthermore, 
because of the regulatory soft approach that corporate America employed, 
the United States typically favored facially neutral policies as the fairest 
method of appointing directors.53  
 
3. Trend Towards Increasing Gender Diverse Boards  
Despite the long period of inaction, in 2011, institutional investors 
began focusing significantly more on environmental, social, and 
 
47 Id. at 12–13. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 16 (quoting Jane W. Barnard, More Women on Corporate 
Boards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703, 703–06 (2007)). 
52 Id. at 16–17. 
53 Id. at 17. 
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governance (ESG) practices because these investors found that ESG 
improves a “company’s performance and reputation, fosters revenue 
growth, and represents an avenue for shareholder engagement.”54 One 
such significant effort was the founding of the Thirty Percent Coalition, 
an organization aimed at obtaining thirty percent female representation on 
U.S. public company boards.55 It implemented a three-pronged plan: 1) its 
Institutional Investors Committee would work directly with companies to 
reform their corporate governance standards and to improve their methods 
for recruiting female directors, 2) its Public Sector Initiatives Committee 
would support legislative efforts at every government level and would 
require, through the SEC, enhanced disclosure requirements in order to 
urge gender diversity, and 3) its Corporate Leaders Committee would 
encourage executives to publicly and privately promote boardroom gender 
diversity.56 Among its membership of corporate leaders were corporations, 
individuals, foundations, funds, and important institutional investors, 
including CalPERS and CalSTRS.57 Even though the Coalition has yet to 
achieve its ultimate goal of thirty percent female representation across 
corporate boards, the Coalition has made slow progress.58 As a result of its 
initiatives to contact direct shareholders of major corporations, sixty-two 
companies, all of which previously had solely male represented boards, 
elected at least one female director.59  
These improvements continued in 2012 and 2016 after the SEC 
amended Regulation S-K; the number of companies that even considered 
diversity increased from fifty-five in 2008 to ninety-three and ninety-five, 
in 2012 and 2016, respectively.60 Additionally, in 2012 and 2016, the 
number of corporations that employed gender as criteria in their director 
selections increased from five in 2008 to forty-two and fifty-three, 
respectively.61 Despite the small increase, companies maintained a level 
of ambiguity regarding their diversity policies. Only six out of the S&P 
100 companies imposed a formal definition of diversity in their diversity 
policies.62 For example, the company Quanex indicated that although “the 
company has no formal policy on diversity for board members, the board 
 
54 Katz & McIntosh, supra note 37. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Nili, supra note 5, at 40.  
61 Id. at 41.  
62 Id. at 42. 
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considers diversity of experience and background in an effort to ensure 
that the composition of our directors creates a strong and effective 
board.”63 These facts show that although corporations might have had 
diversity procedures in place or may have sought gender diversity on the 
boards, the vast majority of these companies’ policies failed to be clear 
and precise; rather the companies “crafted [the policies] in a manner that 
dilute[d] any specific diversity criteria.”64  
In 2014, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published 
a report that indicated that women held sixteen percent of board seats in 
S&P 500 companies—only an eight percent increase from 1997.65 In its 
report, the GAO also predicted that it would be decades before women’s 
board participation equaled that of men’s.66 The report determined 
numerous methods to assist boards in improving their gender diversity, 
such as requiring diverse groups of candidates or including at least one 
woman candidate, setting voluntary targets, expanding board searches and 
board sizes, and enhancing seat turnover through implementing term or 
age limits, as well as executing board performance evaluations.67 Among 
these strategies, the report revealed that stakeholders preferred voluntary 
efforts rather than government mandates, including quotas.68 In March 
2015, nine large pension funds proposed to the SEC that it should require 
the gender, race, and ethnicity of candidates to be disclosed in a chart or 
matrix form, in an effort to improve federal disclosure requirements, 
hoping to ultimately enhance diversity of director candidates.69 The SEC 
implemented this change as part of its Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative, 
a broad-based review of disclosure requirements.  
In addition to the federal and SEC efforts, there have been 
numerous state-wide actions to increase boardroom diversity.70 In May 
2015, the Illinois legislature passed a non-binding resolution encouraging 
public companies to include by 2018 at least three women directors on 
boards of nine or more members, at least two on boards of five to nine 
members, and at least one on boards with fewer than five members.71 
Illinois modeled its resolution after a similar California resolution adopted 
in 2013, and Massachusetts passed a similar resolution in 2015, as well.72 
 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 42.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
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These states predicated their resolutions on studies revealing the business 
benefits to companies that employ women directors.73  
Despite these small initiatives, in 2015, females represented only 
about fifteen percent of outside board member seats in the S&P 1500 and 
approximately eighteen percent of the S&P 500 seats, revealing a median 
of a mere one to two female board members in a group of nine to eleven 
board members.74 At the Women’s Forum of New York, the SEC chair 
Mary Jo White endorsed the organization’s aim of fulfilling forty percent 
female representation on boards of all Fortune 1000 and S&P 500 
companies by 2025.75 Chairwoman White highlighted that a paucity of 
qualified candidates does not exist and that this forty percent goal is “not 
only attainable, but also a business and moral imperative.”76 At this time, 
the SEC staff assessed the disclosures with respect to board diversity to 
determine whether additional guidance or rulemaking would be 
warranted.77 Despite Chairwoman White’s actions, lawmakers criticized 
her for not moving quickly enough to amend disclosure requirements 
regarding board diversity.78 Specifically, lawmakers released a letter 
communicating their “disappointment” that the SEC had not taken action 
yet.79 
Gradually in 2015, more and more studies began indicating that 
companies with women in top management and board positions 
outperform their peers.80 Specifically, International Monetary Fund issued 
new research concluding that an additional woman in senior management 
or on the board of directors, while maintaining the size of the board, 
correlates with a three to eight percent higher return on assets.81 Moreover, 
a MSCI report revealed that companies in the MSCI World Index with 
“strong female leadership generated a return on equity of 10.1 percent per 
year” unlike companies without such leadership that generated a return on 
equity of only 7.4 percent per year.82 Companies comprised of three or 
 
73 Id. 
74 Diane Lerner & Christine Oberholzer Skizas, Where Women Are On 
Board: Perspectives from Gender Diverse Boardrooms, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (2015). 
75 Katz & McIntosh, supra note 37. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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more female directors in at least four of five years outperformed those 
companies without any female directors in at least four out of five years; 
overall, the former companies possessed an eighty-four percent higher 
return on sales, a sixty percent higher return on invested capital, and a 
forty-six percent higher return on equity.83 
 
4. The United States Versus Other Countries  
Even though the increased number of studies began improving the 
awareness of this prevalent issue, the United States remained slower than 
other countries to incorporate gender diversity in boardrooms; these 
countries included Norway, Iceland, Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, 
Italy, Netherlands, Australia, and most notably the United Kingdom.84 
This delay was due to the absence of mandatory quotas in the United 
States, the public’s disapproval of perceived micromanaging of board 
configuration by outside forces, opposition to required target numbers, and 
ignorance regarding the abundance of qualified female directors.85 The 
latter three reasons have been slowly dissipating in the culture of corporate 
America.86 This was largely due to the fact that nominating committees 
possess the power and duty to not only consider diversity as criteria in 
structuring their boards, but also guarantee that they adequately describe 
their board diversity policies through the corporation’s proxy 
disclosures.87 Regarding the first reason, unlike the soft regulatory 
approach in the U.S. that lacks mandatory quota requirements, these 
European countries, plus many others, require companies to maintain a 
specific ratio of females to males on the companies’ boards.88 In particular, 
in 2003, Norway became the first country to enact a law that required all 
delineated company boards to consist of at least forty percent female 
directors and required full compliance by 2008, with Spain, Belgium, 
France, Italy, and the Netherlands adopting similar laws shortly 
thereafter.89  
In early 2015, the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors 
(ACSI), a conglomerate of asset owners and funds, established its 
 
83 Cathy A. Birkeland, Maj Vaseghi, and Drew G. Parkes, Boardroom 
Perspectives: Gender Diversity in Boardrooms Gains Momentum, LATHAM & 
WATKINS 1 (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-gender-
diversity-in-boardrooms-gains-momentum. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  
88 Nili, supra note 5, at 39.  
89 Larcker & Tayan, supra note 1, at 1.  
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dedication to obtain thirty percent female representation on ASX 200 
boards by 2017.90 Its initiative involved targeting companies with all men 
boards, specifically by conducting private meetings with company 
representatives, and if those failed to increase gender diversity in the 
boardroom, then the ACSI would suggest that the corporation’s members 
vote against re-electing the same directors.91 As a result of this initiative, 
in 2016, females constituted fifty percent of all board positions for ASX 
200 companies, as well as women representation on corporate boards 
increased from nineteen percent to twenty-two percent in just one year.92  
In 2016, Germany, the largest economy to enact such a mandate, 
established a thirty percent quota for women on boards.93 Additionally, 
India adopted a quota that required public company boards to hire at least 
one woman.94 Moreover, though the United Kingdom did not establish 
mandatory quotas, it still accomplished meaningful change.95 In particular, 
companies noted that rather than require certain quotas, companies should 
establish their own goals and seek to achieve these goals, recommending 
that the FTSE 100 companies reach twenty-five percent women board 
participation by 2015.96 Much to the country’s surprise, these corporations 
surpassed this suggestion, achieving 26.1% of female directors and 
decreasing the number of solely male corporate boards to zero in the FTSE 
100 companies.97 This immense progress represented a “near revolution . 
. . in the boardroom and [a] profound culture change at the heart of British 
business.”98 Subsequently, the United Kingdom set non-binding targets, 
which adopted a thirty-three percent goal of female board directors at 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 350 companies by 2020, requiring companies to add 
approximately 350 females to its boards.99  
Although mandatory quotas may have been successful for many 
countries, the corporate community of the United States generally agreed 
that quotas are not the best method to obtain increased gender diversity in 
corporate boardrooms; the preferred approach should be that each 
company set its own goal of female board representation, based upon each 
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company’s personal circumstances.100 Though small developments 
occurred in boardroom gender diversity in the United States, a significant 
disparity between female and male board members still has been highly 
prevalent, placing the United States behind these various aforementioned 
countries.101 An analysis of the S&P 500 companies from 2007 to 2015 
revealed that women who were chairs were only one percent of the whole 
female director sample, whereas men were six times more likely to occupy 
a chair position—6.5 percent of the entire male director sample.102 
Additionally, women who were independent directors comprised only 3.6 
percent of the entire female director sample, whereas men were more than 
twice as likely to work as lead directors—7.4 percent of the entire male 
sample.103 The assessment also found that women were less likely to 
occupy a chair position of critical board committees.104 Nonetheless, the 
study revealed that although small, the ratio of women on boards and 
serving as committee chairs was growing, as well as there was a positive 
trend of women gaining access to all of the important board committees.105 
The report further showed that the retail industry possessed the largest 
gender parity—19.2% of females serving as directors.106 On the contrary, 
Industrial Services and Electronic Technology exhibited the smallest 
gender parity—women representing only 7.7% and 8.9%, respectively of 
the board positions.107 Over the course of the entire study, there was a .04 
percent increase each year of the percent of females serving on a board.108 
These statistics affirmed other studies’ results that portrayed an increasing 
trend (though small) towards improving gender diversity on corporate 
boards, as well as illuminated differences in companies, depending upon 
industry, size, and age of the company.109 
Despite this small progression, as of 2016, women constituted 
only 16.2% of corporate boards, numerous companies failed to even have 
female directors on their boards, and some companies lacked any female 
board directors over the past decade.110 Lack of adequate turnover on 
companies’ boards attributed to these low numbers, for minimal vacant 
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board seats inhibited the companies’ ability to enhance diversity on the 
board.111  
Then in 2016, State Street Global Advisors, one of the largest 
institutional investors in the United States, issued the SPDR SSGA Gender 
Diversity Index ETF, an exchange traded fund with the ticker symbol 
SHE.112 The fund invested in U.S. companies that possessed the highest 
level of gender diversity in their sectors.113 It identified that diversity on 
boards correlates to positive long-term performance; as a result, investors 
began questioning investors who failed to nominate women as directors.114 
Although similar funds existed in the past, they were significantly smaller 
in their assets than SHE; in particular, SHE aimed to obtain approximately 
$1.5 to $2 billion in assets just in its first year.115 The vast size and 
prevalence of this fund demonstrated institutional investors’ immense 
interest in and assurance of the performance-related advantages of gender 
diversity in corporate U.S.116 For example, the Children’s Place 
substantially reformed its policy regarding gender diversity on its board.117 
It specifically increased the percentage of women serving as board 
directors from only thirteen percent in 2008 to thirty-six percent in 2016, 
as well as disclosed a clear and precise graphic to investors and to the SEC, 
delineating the gender structure of its board of directors.118 Having four 
female board members, the Children’s Place noted that it sought a board 
with “an appropriate balance in terms of gender.”119 Because of its such 
positive effects, SHE, in which CalSTRS invested $250 million,120 
remains dedicated to increasing gender diverse corporate boards and aims 
to double its investment in the near future.  
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II. WHY THE RECENT MOVEMENT   
A. The Crucial Turning Points of 2016 and 2017  
In March 2016, State Street Advisors commissioned the “Fearless 
Girl” statue as a symbol of increased attention by investors and the public 
to a lack of gender diversity in U.S. corporate boardrooms.121 The 
commissioning of this statue prompted the launching of the State Street’s 
boardroom diversity campaign, sparking a movement throughout the 
nation.122 
With the prospect of the first female President, a majority of 
individuals believed that 2017 would be the “year of the woman.”123 The 
first female President would finally shatter the glass ceiling “into a million 
pieces . . . sprinkl[ing] down like revolution, causing magical dust that 
would bring gender parity and allow women to soar to new heights of 
equality and success.”124 Much to people’s dismay, this dream failed to 
occur. However, individuals did not allow the shattering of this prospect 
to ruin their hopes of this equality—an optimism that marked 2017 the 
critical year for gender equality.  
The year following State Street’s commissioning of the “Fearless 
Girl” statue, advocacy for gender diversity in the boardroom increased 
among institutional investors.125 Specifically, upon the publication of its 
Gender Diversity Index in March 2016, State Street published in March 
2017 its Guidance on Enhancing Gender Diversity on Boards.126 This 
publication issued that State Street would capitalize on its strong voting 
power to vote against all chairs of the nominating and governance 
committees if companies failed to satisfy State Street’s requirements for 
improving gender diversity.127 Consequently, State Street voted against the 
re-election of directors at approximately 400 companies, an amount that 
was greater than ten percent of the total U.S. public companies.128 Though 
not requiring a formal female director quota, companies had to now 
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demonstrate tangible efforts to reform their nominating methods as a 
means to prevent State Street from voting against them.129 Accordingly, 
2017 marked the first year that women and minorities filled a majority of 
vacant S&P 500 independent board seats, a forty-two percent increase 
from 2016.130  
 
B. Impact of Growing Trend of Improving Gender Diverse Boards 
Since the commissioning of the Fearless Girl statue, the launch of 
State Street’s campaign, evidence that gender diversity in boardrooms 
enhances company performance, and mandatory quotas for female 
directors in several European countries,131 forty-two companies began to 
address the lack of gender diversity in the boardroom.132 For instance, 
BlackRock and Vanguard—two of the largest United States institutional 
investors—announced their dedication to prioritizing gender diversity on 
their boards.133 In February 2017, BlackRock reformed its voting 
standards to require at least two female directors on every public 
company’s board.134 In March 2017, BlackRock established that its top 
engagement goals included focusing on what steps companies are taking 
to improve boardroom diversity, as well as assured it would hold 
nominating and governance committees responsible for failing to take 
such steps.135 In August 2017, Vanguard published its Investment 
Stewardship 2017 Annual Report, in which it indicated that the firm would 
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base its future voting decisions on whether companies are employing 
meaningful improvements regarding board diversity.136  
In addition to action by these institutional investors, Congress 
began taking steps toward advancing gender diversity in the boardroom. 
In particular, in May 2017, Representatives Carolyn B. Maloney and 
Donald S. Beyer submitted a letter to SEC Chair Jay Clayton that 
advocated “[t]he SEC has the opportunity and ability to enforce the 
transparency that is critical to securing gender balanced corporate 
leadership. Boardrooms with gender parity lead stronger, healthier 
companies, return more to their shareholders, and help our economy 
grow.”137   
Additionally, in August 2017, CalPERS sent over 500 letters to 
companies, indicating that the company’s board lacked gender diversity.138 
The letters urged each company to develop and to disclose its policy 
concerning boardroom diversity, and to release a boardroom diversity 
implementation plan in its governance documents.139 As a result, thirty-
five of these boards adopted at least one woman.140 Furthermore, on 
September 8, 2017, the New York City Comptroller, Scott M. Stringer, 
and the New York City Pension Funds launched the Boardroom 
Accountability Project 2.0, which increased the pressure on the S&P 500 
companies to improve diversity on their boards.141 Specifically, Stringer 
submitted letters to the boards of 151 companies requiring them to 
“publicly disclose the skills, race and gender of board members and to 
discuss their process for adding and replacing board members.”142 
Stringer’s goal for this project was to create a board matrix that would 
determine the skills, experience, sexual orientation, gender, age, and race 
of the director and board tenure, as well as to make such disclosure of 
information significantly more routine for S&P 500 companies.143  
In 2017, the number of shareholder proposals concerning board 
diversity reached its record high.144 Such shareholder proposals included 
“requesting that the board adopt a policy to improve boardroom or senior 
management diversity” and “requesting a report on the company’s plans 
for increasing boardroom or senior management diversity.”145 These 
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proposals, on which companies voted received about 28.3% of the votes 
cast, as opposed to merely 19.1% of the votes cast in 2016; twenty-five 
percent of these proposals passed ,and several others settled before they 
even reached a vote.146 Companies receiving such proposals included 
Apple, Bank of America, BlackRock, Chevron, Coca-Cola, Colgate-
Palmolive, Continental Resources, Dominion Energy, EOG Resources, 
Exxon Mobil, Facebook, General Electric, Johnson & Johnson, Procter & 
Gamble, and Walmart.147 Moreover, Institutional Shareholder Services, 
Inc., a leading shareholder advisory firm, urged shareholders to vote for 
all but two of the 2017 diversity proposals.148 In addition to these 
initiatives by companies, ISS and Glass Lewis—the largest and most 
influential proxy advisor firms—declared their new dedication to 
prioritize gender diversity.149 
As a result of the growing attention and dedication to improving 
gender diversity in corporate boardrooms by institutional investors,150 in 
October 2018, California became the first state to codify requirements of 
gender diversity in corporate boardrooms.151 California enacted a law, 
Senate Bill 826, that established several requirements for publicly traded 
companies incorporated in California or foreign corporations, i.e. 
Delaware corporations headquartered in California and enumerated on 
major U.S. stock exchanges.152 These mandates included that corporations 
include at least one female director by the end of 2019 and include at least 
three female directors if the board of directors comprises of six or more 
members, at least two female directors if the board consists of five 
members, or at least one female director if the board consists of four or 
fewer members by the end of 2021.153 The California Secretary of State 
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imposed penalties that any company in violation of this law would be 
subject to a $100,000 fine for a first-time violation and a $300,000 fine for 
a second violation, and each subsequent violation thereafter.154 In addition 
to the financial penalties, the Secretary of State would publish annual 
reports indicating which corporations had and had not complied with the 
law in the prior year.155 As of June 2017, approximately 377 corporations 
would need to appoint women directors to their boards to comply with the 
law by 2021.156 More specifically, sixty-six companies would need to elect 
three females to their boards, 175 companies would need to elect two 
females to their boards, and 136 companies would need to elect one female 
to their boards.157  
California enacted the law in an effort to narrow the “gender gap 
in business.”158 However, California Governor Jerry Brown expressed that 
companies raised “serious legal concerns” regarding the statute, in terms 
of “how California could profess to control the internal corporate affairs 
of a foreign corporation . . . .”159 Governor Brown dissipated these 
concerns by highlighting that Section 2115 of the California long arm 
statute “purports to apply to foreign corporations that satisfy certain tests 
related to presence in California (minimum contacts), referred to as 
‘pseudo-foreign corporations.’”160 Despite these concerns and initial 
backlash, by enacting this law, California took a significant step in forging 
the movement for not only gender diversity in boardrooms, but also, more 
significantly, gender parity.  
 
C. The Current State 
Institutional investors implemented significant awareness and 
progress in the past few years regarding boardroom diversity. For the first 
time, women and minorities comprised half of the 397 newest independent 
directors at S&P 500 companies.161 However, in 2017, women still 
constituted only seventeen percent of corporate boards, and over 600 
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boards did not even have any female directors.162 This current state of 
gender diversity indicates the immense evolution and improvement that 
these Fortune 500 companies still need. According to a FactSet’s report 
published in September 2018, the percentage of companies in the Russell 
3000 stock index with no female board members decreased from twenty-
three percent to eighteen percent and the percentage of companies in which 
women hold fifteen percent of the board seats or fewer declined from fifty-
eight percent to forty-seven percent163 Additionally, only twenty-two 
companies have boards with an equal number of men and women, and 
women comprise the board majority at only fourteen companies—
shockingly an increase from previously comprising the board majority at 
only four companies.164 The worst statistic that the FactSet’s report 
revealed was that women led only five percent of companies in the Russell 
3000 index—a percentage that remained the same from March 2017.165 
The most recent statistics revealed that the number of women on U.S. 
public company boards maintains a slow and steady growth.166 
Specifically, the 2020 Gender Diversity Index showed that women 
represented 17.9% of Fortune 1000 company directors, 19.7% of Fortune 
500 company directors, and 22.3% of Fortune 100 company directors in 
2015. If this current rate persists, corporate boards will not achieve gender 
parity until 2055.167  
Despite slow progress, and the fact that the number of women on 
boards in the U.S. is increasing slower than those in other countries, a 
general consensus and collective action exist towards improving gender 
diversity at the top levels of corporate America.168 In response to the slow 
rate of improvement of boardroom gender diversity and in an effort to 
increase the number of women board members at a faster growth rate, 
individuals founded various organizations.169 One such group is the 2020 
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Women on Boards, which aims to reform the review process for directors 
in order to add more females in the pool of director candidates.170  
Especially in the past year, there has been a significant trend 
toward prioritizing gender diversity on corporate boards. This growing 
trend is due to activism going global in 2017, international developments, 
workplace trends, enhanced investor sentiment, and SEC disclosure 
requirements. First, regulators and legislators encouraged gender balance 
on public company boards—as seen through State Street’s campaign and 
the SEC disclosure requirements.171 The Norwegian quota regime 
conducted a study that showed that women directors were more likely to 
introduce into the boardroom a “more vigilant and probing approach, and 
women may be particularly adept at critically questioning, guiding and 
advising management without disrupting the overall working relationship 
between the board and management.”172 Additionally (according to a 
report of Israeli boards), boards comprised of at least three female and 
three male directors “are found to be at least 79% more active at board 
meetings than those without such representation and that [g]ender-
balanced boards are also more likely to replace underperforming chief 
executive officers (CEOs) and are particularly active during periods when 
CEOs are being replaced.”173 A recent Wellesley College study on 
boardroom gender diversity highlighted that having three or more women 
on a board leads to improved dynamics and advantages in board 
governance.174  
Second, regarding workplace trends, since the 1960s there has 
been a substantial political movement for gender equality and anti-
discrimination. Increasing gender diversity on boards echoes and further 
advances this movement, in that doing so allows equal opportunities to 
females, against whom employers historically discriminated or barred 
from positions of power.175 Especially in 2017, there was a huge campaign 
targeted at replacing CEOs.176 New CEOs meant restructuring the boards, 
which in turn allowed increased gender diversity on these boards.177  
Third, regarding improved investor sentiment, companies have 
underscored that:  
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a board composed of directors representing a range of 
perspectives leads to an environment of collaborative 
tension that is the essence of good governance. In a room 
where everyone has different points of view and there is 
greater opportunity for cross-pollination of ideas, there 
are fewer unspoken assumptions, less group think and a 
greater likelihood of innovation. This allows the board to 
ask the probing questions and tackle the challenging 
issues, such as risk management and succession planning, 
which are at the center of good corporate governance.178 
 
Several pieces of evidence suggest that gender diverse boards 
provide a myriad of benefits to corporate governance and ultimately the 
overall company’s performance. For example, a recent study revealed that 
companies comprised of the highest percentage of women on their boards 
possessed a rate of return of approximately fifty-three percent higher than 
companies comprised of the lowest percentage of women on their 
boards.179 Several other studies showed that a diverse group of high-
functioning individuals will likely perform significantly better than a non-
diverse group of high-functioning individuals.180 Another study 
demonstrated that “boards focused on gender diversity within the 
boardroom are also more likely to utilize talent pools more effectively, 
have a better understanding of the employee and customer bases, and that 
signaling that the company cares about diversity may be effective in 
bolstering economic arguments.”181 Additionally, studies exhibited that an 
increased number of females on corporate boards and serving in senior 
management positions correlates with increased earnings, higher total 
shareholder return, and increased surplus return.182 Overall, companies 
with more female members on their boards demonstrated significantly 
greater valuations than boards with none.183  
Further regarding investor sentiment, board diversity has been 
broadly identified as one of the leading measurements showing a 
compelling correlation with improved shareholder value and company 
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performance.184 Given these numerous studies that prove gender diversity 
could enhance performance and governance, an increasing number of 
corporate companies recognized such effects.185 As a result, because 
investors wish to reap the benefits of such improved performance and 
governance, investors became more attracted to the idea of boardroom 
gender diversity.186 Moreover, company directors highlighted that “having 
a wide range of perspectives represented in the boardroom is critical to 
effective corporate governance.”187 In particular, because today’s boards 
face scrutiny from investors, the media, non-governmental organizations, 
and many others, no one person can solve the board’s problems. Rather, a 
board that consists of varied perspectives, experiences, and diverse 
backgrounds allows the decision-making process to consider various risks 
and consequences of the potential actions.188 In general, advocates provide 
social and moral justifications, corporate finance reasons, and corporate 
governance evidence to support increasing gender diversity within 
corporate boardrooms.189  
Lastly, the SEC disclosure requirements contributed to 
companies’ maintaining concrete policies regarding gender diversity in the 
companies’ boardrooms.190 Studies revealed the link between the 
information that a company discloses to its investors and the company’s 
gender diversity ratio.191 In particular, companies that referenced gender 
in their diversity disclosure tended to possess a higher ratio of women 
board members than companies that lacked a diversity procedure or 
companies that had a policy that only addressed differences in viewpoints, 
as opposed to gender diversity.192  
Because of these various aforementioned studies, institutional 
investors began to view corporate governance not merely as a “means-to-
an end administrative or procedural framework,” but as the foundation of 
a company that can be an “overarching value driver.”193 These studies 
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further caused investors to see gender diversity not just as a social cause, 
but as a “matter of better corporate governance and thus can enjoy, and 
harness, the support of the investor community—in particular large 
institutional investors.”194  
 
D. Counterarguments and Opposition  
Despite the positive attraction board gender diversity received and 
the numerous studies suggesting the association between gender diverse 
boards and performance enhancement, some studies revealed the contrary; 
opponents largely predicate their critical views on these studies.195 For 
example, some MSCI studies showed that female participation on boards 
does not, in fact, statistically correlate to increased performance metrics 
and that corporate performance actually decreased after several countries 
implemented female quota requirements.196 Furthermore, unlike 
institutional investors, who growingly exhibited their dedication to 
increasing female representation on corporate boards, activist funds 
continue to dismiss nominating females onto their boards.197 For instance, 
since 2011, five of the largest U.S. activist funds nominated only seven 
female directors out of the total 174 nominated, and females represented 
less than a mere five percent of actual director positions.198 Additionally, 
out of the director nominees that Carl Icahn’s Icahn Associates Holding 
selected, none of the candidates were female—contrary to the S&P 
companies that elected twenty-six percent females to their vacant board 
positions during the same time frame.199  
These statistics reflect the various opposition that gender diversity 
faced. Some scholars believe that studies, which consulting firms and 
financial institutions performed are not nearly as rigorous as those that 
peer-reviewed academic research conducted.200 More specifically, two 
meta-analyses that summarize the results of several peer-reviewed studies 
revealed that the relationship between gender diversity in boardrooms and 
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a corporation’s overall performance is either effectively zero or is very 
weakly positive; they further suggested that no evidence exists that 
indicates increased female representation, or just the mere presence of 
women, on corporate boards “actually” benefits the company’s 
performance.201 These studies demonstrated that because there is no 
concrete “business case” for or against nominating female corporate board 
members, companies should hire females to their boards due to gender 
equality, rather than because “gender diversity on boards leads to 
improvements in company performance.”202 Statistically, the studies 
found a .047 correlation between gender diverse boards and firm 
accounting performance, and an even lower correlation between gender 
diverse boards and firm market performance, including stock performance 
and shareholder returns—numbers that were so small that they both were 
virtually statistically insignificant.203  
Additionally, these studies refute the theory that companies with 
more gender diverse boards will outperform those with less gender diverse 
boards.204 The academic research rejects this conclusion based upon its 
belief that females appointed to corporate boards do not actually possess 
values, experience, and knowledge distinct from that of pre-existing male 
board members.205 Rather, the opposing research argues that females’ 
accomplishments, experiences, and competencies are actually quite 
similar to those of their male counterparts; thus, adding females to solely 
male boards would not improve the board’s “cognitive variety” as much 
as supporters believe.206  
Another reason upon which this academic research predicates its 
opposition to gender diverse boards is that the women, as minorities on the 
board, will fail to “speak up in board conversations[,]” due to fear of 
“expressing beliefs and opinions that run counter to the beliefs and 
opinions of the majority of the group.”207 Moreover, opponents alleged 
that as soon as boards appoint women members, these women will “lack 
the influence to change the board’s decision[,]” because “the majority 
group members may discount their views” as minorities or outliers on the 
board.208 Lastly, opponents argued that even if increased female 
representation on corporate boards enhances a company’s cognitive 
variety and decision making, this additional representation would only 
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benefit a corporation’s accounting performance (such as its sales, profits, 
or return on assets); this additional representation would not benefit the 
company’s market returns, and these critics argue the benefit to its 
accounting returns would only be minimal.209 In general, based upon 
academic research, opponents alleged that considering “all the studies of 
board diversity and company performance that have been conducted to 
date, it seems very unlikely that new research will reveal a strong, clear 
relationship between board diversity and company performance.”210 
Because some studies revealed negative or weak positive correlations 
between gender diversity on corporate boards and overall company 
performance, opponents adopted harsh and critical views regarding 
increasing gender diversity in corporate boardrooms.211 Opponents rely on 
these weak connections to justify their dismissal of implementing policies 
or initiatives to improve gender diverse boards. As a result, these critics 
have contributed to the stagnant state of female representation on 
corporate boards.   
Despite these various counterarguments and studies that failed to 
support gender diverse boards, scholars have indicated two unanimous 
conclusions prevalent among corporate directors regarding boardroom 
gender diversity. First, corporate directors recognize the immense 
importance of diversity on boards, emphasizing that boards should 
enhance their gender diversity.212 Second, corporate directors struggled to 
highlight concrete examples of the impact that gender diverse boards made 
on the company.213 Both these responses affirm the challenge of 
sufficiently linking the advantages of diversity within boardrooms,214 a 
difficulty that contributes to the slow trend of enhancing gender diversity 
on corporate boards. Nonetheless, in light of the various opponents, 
several prominent and influential corporations remain dedicated to 
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improving gender diversity on their boards.215 Despite the backlash from 
the activist funds, it is significantly more noteworthy that major 
institutional investors, such as those included in the S&P 500, maintain 
advocacy for increasing gender diversity in their boardrooms.216  
 
III. FUTURE SOCIAL IMPACT OF INCREASING GENDER DIVERSITY IN 
CORPORATE BOARDROOMS 
Although the dreams of the first female President have yet to come 
true, women have marked a changing landscape in today’s corporate 
world. Institutional investors began prioritizing gender diversity in 
corporate boardrooms, and despite the slow and minimal improvements, 
progress remains.217 However, even if companies increase their 
representation of women on corporate boards or achieve equal gender 
representation on their boards, the intended result of gender diversity still 
lacks, and the issue of substantive gender diversity still exists.218 This issue 
of substantive gender diversity refers to equal treatment of genders within 
the boardroom, as well as actually achieving equal representation on the 
boards.219 Boards are so focused on obtaining a “magic number” of gender 
representation that they fail to allow women the equal opportunity to 
actually make an impact on the boards.220 Although on the board, women 
still face stereotyping discrimination, which inhibits their ability to earn 
credibility and respect.221 Companies often only contact women for 
positions on boards due to their diverse demographic, as opposed to their 
unique qualifications or perspectives.222 Without equal treatment within 
the boardroom, the progress to achieve equal representation on the board 
is virtually useless. Because most of the gender stereotypes are a product 
of the older generation, these attitudes are becoming more and more 
rare.223 In particular, the development of instantaneous communications 
and technology began to remove these traditional national and cultural 
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barriers.224 However, given that some of these antiquated attitudes still 
remain, regulatory, legislative, and investor-driven strategies will be the 
most useful in order to expedite the progress that companies made towards 
achieving gender equality.225 
Additionally, boards have become more appreciative of varied 
perspectives.226 Some women directors reported that although their gender 
played a part in their initial nominations, it was not an ongoing factor—
once they established their experience and reputation for effectiveness on 
the board, their constituents recognized their individual qualifications and 
skills and respected their opinions.227 Furthermore, the pool of women 
considered is expanding and companies are increasingly recognizing the 
importance of diverse perspectives on their boards.228 Given that 
advancing women’s equality can add $12 trillion to global growth,229 
continuing to focus on improving boardroom gender diversity will prove 
useful to the overall economy.  
Narrowing the focus, the recent California law consists of several 
potentially powerful implications for boardroom equality.230 Specifically, 
because the California law explicitly employed gender classifications, 
likely causing heightened judicial scrutiny, scholars predicted that this law 
could lead to a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, 
both federally and at the state-level.231 Moreover, given that the law 
applies to corporations not incorporated in California, but headquartered 
and with principal places of business in California, the law could cause 
challenges pursuant to the “internal affairs” doctrine; this doctrine 
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establishes that “only one state has the authority to regulate a corporation’s 
internal affairs.”232   
Due to these potentially drastic consequences, scholars urged that 
“affected companies should start preparing for compliance to avoid the 
negative financial, reputational and potential business impacts of non-
compliance,”—all of which could have severe effects for major 
institutional companies.233 
 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
In order to adequately implement gender diversity in boardrooms, 
investors should urge companies to take more action, rather than merely 
adding additional females to the board.234  Scholars determined several 
ways in which nominating committees can adequately implement diverse 
opinions and views into the process of choosing candidates.235 First, the 
committee should identify the competencies, skills, and goals it desires in 
a candidate and create a method to assess for those abilities.236 Second, the 
committee should perform a gap analysis of the board that includes the 
entire spectrum of competencies in order to increase awareness of all the 
various factors considered in composing the board.237 Third, the 
committee should prioritize effective communicative and interpersonal 
skills.238 Fourth, the committee should broaden the candidate pool, for 
much data has shown that there is a significant number of qualified women 
immediately below the C-suite level.239 Lastly, the committee should 
implement a thorough director evaluation process in order to preserve 
common boardroom standards and goals.240  
In addition to these initiatives, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar, 
who helped lead advocacy for increased gender diversity in corporate 
boardrooms, proposed three approaches to implement such advocacy.241 
First, the SEC can closely scrutinize the mandatory diversity disclosure 
requirements and provide feedback to companies in an effort to guarantee 
that investors gain effective knowledge about the diversity policies of 
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corporations.242 Second, the NYSE and NASDAQ could facilitate a blue-
ribbon panel of industry leaders to “develop best practices for improving 
board diversity.”243 Instead of requiring companies to adopt the standards, 
companies would either adopt these “best practices” or if not, justify why 
they failed to do so—referred to as “comply-or-explain.”244 Implementing 
these diversity best practices while simultaneously adopting the SEC rule 
enhances the disclosure’s quality, for these best practices serve as the 
standard by which the exchanges would review companies’ dedication to 
diversity.245 Lastly, corporations could adopt the NFL’s Rooney Rule, 
which mandates that all NFL teams interview at least one minority 
applicant for a head coaching job.246 Similarly, a Rooney Rule for 
corporate boards would require nominating committees of corporations to 
interview at least one female for each vacant position of a director; the 
NYSE and NASDAQ would be responsible for implementing and 
enforcing such rule.247  
The United States’ low emphasis on clear and precise policy 
disclosures to investors began to enhance the diversity of corporate 
boardrooms. However, adding more females as members of boards is only 
a stepping stone toward the greater goal of achieving a completely gender 
diverse board.248 Even though the United States exemplifies a soft 
regulatory approach to gender diversity that placed it behind Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Norway, France, and other countries, the United States 
need not employ mandatory quotas to achieve gender diverse corporate 
boards. Because numerous studies highlighted that gender inequality 
exists across various industries and across market cap sizes, advocates of 
gender diverse boards must analyze companies on a company-by-
company basis, rather than apply a per se assessment; doing so ensures the 
most comprehensive and thorough analysis of gender parity on corporate 
boards.249  
“Diversity for the sake of diversity” harms performance quality, 
especially when it causes forced turnover and hiring less qualified 
directors.250 As a result, in order to adequately address and enhance gender 
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diversity in corporate boardrooms, scholars and advocates of such cause 
need to dive deeper into the issue and focus on substantive diversity, with 
efforts aimed at hiring qualified directors, rather than hiring based on 
quotas.251  
CONCLUSION 
A board that is genuinely diverse affords women “more than a seat 
at the table—it grants them the ability to have a voice and an impact,”252 
an opportunity that is far greater, more tangible, and more powerful than 
a figurehead seat with no voice. Various initiatives and advocacy make 
abundantly clear that corporate America no longer desires a homogenous 
board. Despite the immense progress that corporations began to make, 
significant room still exists to achieve “genuine” gender diversity within 
the boardroom. Even greater progress remains to achieve complete gender 
parity. Advocacy and efforts aimed at holding corporations accountable 
for their policies can help evolve the movement. More significantly, 
increasing pressure on corporations to not only appoint, but also respect 
and listen to more female board members further progresses the cause. 
Though the extent of the impact of increasing gender diversity in 
boardrooms remains unclear, it is quite unambiguous that gender diversity 
can only benefit a corporation. At this point, there is no going back to the 
once homogenous corporate boardroom world.  
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